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When they first appeared during the ‘Golden Age of Comics’ (1938 
to 1954), ‘supervillains’ were little more than eccentric gangsters. 
Criminals with clear motives, they were distinguished from the norm 
by their use of technological gimmicks or weird costumes rather than 
special powers. Genuinely ‘monstrous’ supervillains such as the Joker, 
Two-Face and the undead Solomon Grundy were in the minority. 
As Mark Edward DiPaolo says, the ‘Golden Age’ Joker was a ‘sane, 
Moriarty figure’ (DiPaolo 2009: 205). However, the self-regulation 
of the American comics industry from 1954, under the auspices of 
the Comics Code Authority (CCA), created conditions that caused 
characters such as these to evolve into motiveless psychopaths, often 
mutated or deformed.
The portrayal of the Joker as a homicidal nihilist in the 2008 film 
The Dark Knight is the logical end result of the CCA’s restrictions 
on the depiction of crime. In other appearances (in comics, games 
and cartoons) the Joker may appear to have a straightforward motive 
(usually revenge or the acquisition of money), but this does not make his 
personality any more intelligible to the viewer; he is first and foremost 
a monster. As Alan Moore explains, this aspect can also be frustrating 
for the comic-book author:
306
Fennell
[The Killing Joke was about] a couple of psychopaths, and unlikely 
psychopaths at that because, yeah, there are plenty of psychopaths in 
the real world but we don’t have any that dress up as a circus clown or a 
bat. So, like I said, you’re not going to encounter these people on your 
next trip to the 7-11 or whatever, and knowing that their psychoses 
are a mirror image of each other is not really going to improve your 
life any. So that was what was wrong with The Killing Joke from my 
point of view (Khoury 2003:123).
Despite this valid criticism, The Killing Joke is still regarded as a 
classic story within the Batman canon. It may not be immediately 
relevant to the real world, but superhero stories do not necessarily have 
to be. It is a common (and perhaps over-generalised) observation that 
the heroes and villains of these works are archetypes. However, I will 
argue that they represent more than merely ‘good’ and ‘evil.’ I believe 
that the disfigured villains of comics have something profound to say 
about criminality, justice and political legitimacy, especially when 
compared to similarly ‘deformed’ heroes, such as Marvel’s X-Men.
In part 1, I will run through the provisions of the CCA code, 
highlighting the restrictions it placed upon the artistic depiction of 
criminality.  I will follow this in part 2 with an overview of theories of 
punishment through history. My intent is to argue that our aesthetic 
expectations of criminality have been shaped by a conception of justice 
based primarily upon vengeance, and by the remnants of a political 
philosophy that regarded crime not as the infringement of a social 
contract, but as a personal affront to the sovereign, who reaffirmed 
his legitimacy by avenging himself upon the criminal. In part 3, I 
will discuss the parallels between the superhero and the mediaeval 
nobleman. These parallels will be used to illustrate the important 
role played by the deranged, deformed supervillain. In so doing I 
will demonstrate that the CCA code, though reviled by many comic 
enthusiasts and historians, was ultimately a force for the good by 
encouraging this evolution of the fictional evildoer.
Before proceeding with the discussion, I must first admit that not 
all comic-book villains are mutated or mutilated; in particular, the 
majority of female evildoers are deformed in other ways. However, those 
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villains who are disfigured bear scars reminiscent of mediaeval punitive 
mutilations, which simultaneously advertised an individual’s essential 
criminality, and the nature of his wrongdoing. At this juncture I must 
also point out that the following arguments about honour, vengeance, 
punishment and justice are specific to the Western articulations of 
these concepts. This article will focus on the American superhero genre 
in particular; no attempt at cross-cultural comparison has been made 
here, though I would hope this essay might in some way contribute to 
such a study in the future.
1 The Code
One of the most significant years in the history of the American 
comics industry was 1954. In that year, psychiatrist Fredric Wertham’s 
Seduction of the Innocent was published. Wertham’s book linked comic 
books juvenile delinquency, and was the first ever publication to 
present a homosexual reading of the Batman/Robin relationship. 
Also in 1954, the US Senate subcommittee on juvenile delinquency 
convened hearings on the possible negative influence of crime and 
horror comics on children. At the time, William Gaines was the head 
of EC Publishing which was responsible for such series as Tales From 
the Crypt. Gaines voluntarily attended the April 1954 subcommittee 
hearing, only to discover that no consideration was going to be given to 
genre or context; Gaines was presented with the cover of that month’s 
issue of Crime SuspenStories, which depicted a man holding a woman’s 
severed head in one hand and a bloody axe in the other, and asked if 
he believed the image was ‘in good taste’. In what Scott McCloud 
describes as ‘a public relations disaster for comics’ (2001: 86), Gaines 
allegedly responded, ‘Yes, sir, I do ... for the cover of a horror comic.’
Due to the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, 
censorship of comics was not feasible, but in the face of fierce and 
widespread criticism, comics publishers agreed to self-regulate. This 
self-regulation took the form of the CCA Code for Editorial Matter, 
adopted on October 26, 1954 and was, as Amy Kiste Nyberg notes, 
“literally thrown together overnight” (Nyberg 1998: 157). General 
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Standards Part A of the Code mandated that ‘Crimes shall never be 
presented in such a way as to create sympathy for the criminal, to 
promote distrust of the forces of law and justice, or to inspire others 
with a desire to imitate crimes’. Thus, no comics were allowed to ‘present 
the unique details and methods’ of any crime. Additionally, no ‘unique 
or unusual methods’ of concealing weapons could be shown, and 
depictions of violence such as ‘knife and gun play’ and ‘physical agony’ 
were prohibited. Policemen, judges, government officials and ‘respected 
institutions’ were always to be presented in ways that reaffirmed 
‘established authority’. Scenes of policemen being killed as a result of 
criminal activity were to be ‘discouraged’. The crime of kidnapping 
merited its own sub-section, never to be portrayed in any detail or to be 
shown generating any profit for the kidnapper. Crime was always to be 
presented as ‘a sordid and unpleasant activity’. Criminals were never to 
be presented as glamorous, ‘good’ was always to triumph over ‘evil’, and 
if a comics publisher insisted on using the word ‘crime’ in the title of a 
comic, it was never to appear alone on the cover (Sassienie 1994: 60).
General Standards Part B of the code was just as exacting: ‘lurid, 
unsavoury, gruesome illustrations’ were to be ‘eliminated’, along with 
‘all scenes of horror, excessive bloodshed, gory or gruesome crimes, 
depravity, lust, sadism [and] masochism’ Also banned were depictions 
of ‘[the] walking dead, torture, vampires and vampirism, ghouls, 
cannibalism and werewolfism’. If ‘evil’ was to appear in a story, it 
would only be permitted if the intent was ‘to illustrate a moral issue’, 
and it was never to be presented in such a way that would ‘injure the 
sensibilities of the reader’. The section entitled ‘Costume’ forbade nudity 
of any kind, and another entitled ‘Marriage and Sex’ forbade sexual 
‘abnormalities’ and ‘perversions’, and mandated an emphasis on ‘the 
sanctity of marriage’ (Sassienie 1994: 60).2
In short, crime was to be unpleasant and nasty, never profitable, 
objectively ‘evil’ and totally unattractive, and there would be no logical 
reason given as to why anyone should engage in criminal activity. Crime 
simply happened because it was what ‘bad people’ did; ‘evil’ was the 
compulsion to engage in crime for its own sake. The CCA code thus 
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indirectly mandated that ne’er-do-wells be depicted as sub-humans 
whose criminal nature is overt, visible and therefore containable. Given 
that the same code prohibited the depiction of vampires, ghouls, the 
walking dead and werewolves, it is perhaps not unreasonable to suppose 
that frustrated comics writers and artists would channel their more 
macabre instincts into the creation of criminal characters. Ironically, 
as Richard Reynolds asserts, ‘it was the excesses of the horror comics 
which led indirectly to the renaissance of the superhero genre’ by adding 
to the public outcry over violence in comics (Reynolds 1994: 8). There 
was also the fact that superhero comics were a reliable source of income 
and an infrequent cause of controversy, which made them attractive to 
publishers for purely economic reasons (Nyberg 1998: 158-9).
The growing enthusiasm for superhero comics may well have been 
encouraged by the artistic style that defined the genre. Groensteen 
lists five characteristics of the ‘narrative drawing’: ‘Anthropocentrism’, 
denoting how narrative drawings privilege ‘the agent of the action’ 
in each panel; ‘synecdochic [sic] simplification’, which describes how 
the narrative drawing ‘evacuates that which is not necessary to the 
intelligibility of the represented situation’, focusing only on those 
elements ‘that have an immediately informative character’; ‘typification’, 
or the simplification of characters into recognisable types, veering 
towards stereotype; ‘expressivity’, whereby the expressions and body-
language of characters combine to convey particular emotions; and 
‘rhetorical convergence’, describing how narrative drawings obey ‘an 
imperative of optimal legibility’ (Groensteen 2007:161-2). In other 
words, everything is geared towards the efficient telling of a story, a 
paradigm which sometimes requires recognisable visual cues – the 
comic reader can often read a character’s intentions and moral fibre in 
their very design.
The comic-book villain, as constructed via the stylistic norms 
outlined above, is much more unnerving than any real-world criminal, 
because he has no intelligible motive. Thus, the stage was set for the 
emergence of truly psychotic villains when the constraints were relaxed, 
almost twenty years after the Code’s implementation. The code was 
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revised numerous times before it was finally abandoned in 2011. There 
are several reasons for the eventual abandonment of the Code; Reynolds 
maintains that the growth of comics’ adult readership gave publishers 
the strength to simply bypass the CCA code by the 1980s (Reynolds 
1994: 9), whereas Sassienie highlights the importance of issues 96 to 
98 of Amazing Spider-Man (which were released in 1971 from May to 
July). These issues contained an anti-drug storyline in which drug use 
was actually depicted, and consequently had to be distributed without 
the CCA seal of approval on the cover. After a positive response to the 
storyline from parents, teachers and news media, the CCA reviewed 
its policies and the code was altered, allowing for similar stories to be 
published in the future. The CCA also lifted the ban on the depiction 
of creatures such as werewolves and zombies, so that ‘the following year 
newsstands were once again full of horror comics’ (Sassienie 1994: 96).
As the code weakened, darker works aimed specifically at adults 
started to appear, and provided an impetus for some more disturbing 
takes on familiar characters, such as writer Dennis O’Neill’s and artist 
Neal Adams’ celebrated Batman run, which re-established the Joker as 
a dangerous killer, and redeemed him from the ‘silly rather than evil’ 
prankster characterisation of the 1960s (Klock 2002: 35). In so doing, 
he became far more chaotic a character than he had been previously, 
an evolution DiPaolo links to ‘the emergence of celebrity serial killers 
such as Charles Manson and the Zodiac Killer, or the sickening 
pointlessness of the Cleveland Elementary School murders’ (DiPaolo 
2009: 206).  This increased malice and cruelty was to become a trend 
for supervillains across the board, along with physical appearances 
every bit as abhorrent as their personalities.
Strictly speaking, there is no comparison to be made between 
mutilated supervillains and ‘deformed’ superheroes. Marvel has 
produced many more ‘freakish’ heroes than most other comics 
publishers, and has frequently presented these characters as members 
of a persecuted minority – for example, Spider-Man is libelled in the 
New York City tabloid press, the Incredible Hulk spent much of his 
life on the run from the US military before joining forces with them 
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as a member of the Avengers, and X-Men’s mutants have always had 
to contend with government harassment and persecution. The Marvel 
universe is populated almost exclusively by ‘freaks’, although some 
characters also have access to ‘normal’ lives: The Hulk spends at least 
half of his time as the handsome and intelligent Bruce Banner, while 
Spider-Man is thoroughly average in behaviour and appearance when 
not in costume.
The X-Men, meanwhile, are not allowed such a reprieve. Instead, 
they are constantly castigated by politicians, the press and the armed 
forces. However, the cause of this persecution is an array of outlandish 
genetic adaptations granting exotic abilities such as flight, telekinesis, 
invisibility, and a myriad other glamorous superpowers. A much more 
convincing portrayal of a downtrodden mutant underclass can be found 
in Dan Mishkin and Tom Mandrake’s four-issue miniseries Creeps 
(which ran from 2001-2002). In this series, most of the heroes appear 
to be homeless, and their powers are all either repulsive or debilitating 
– such as putty-like flab, full-body mucus production, and a physical 
form made up of insects.
While there are some deformed heroes, by and large the most 
severe deformities and injuries are reserved for villains, a fact which 
changes the reader’s question from a sympathetic ‘What happened to 
you?’ to a fearful and accusatory ‘What did you do to deserve that? ’. 
This trend becomes more interesting when one examines the roots of 
the popularity of superheroes, and the theory of justice as reciprocity.
2 The right to punish
Revenge, honour and violence have formed the basis of the dominant 
Western conception of justice for centuries. Thinkers like Montesquieu 
and John Rawls, who advocate proportionate and dispassionate 
approaches to punishment, are exceptions to a violent norm. Most 
philosophers who have considered the question of justice have 
concluded that our ideas of what constitutes fair punishment are based 
primarily upon our need for vengeance, to hurt the ones who have hurt 
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us. Therefore, I would argue that the link between mutilation and 
criminality – the aesthetic of villainy  – arises from an understanding 
of punishment as a form of violence. The presumed link is a causal one, 
with the mutilation or deformity occurring as a punishment for some 
misdemeanour, or as the manifestation of a villainous nature.
In what follows, I will suggest an origin and history for this cultural 
tendency, that ancient and mediaeval cultures of honour codified the 
right to punish into a mark of nobility. Political legitimacy was equated 
with the authority to mutilate, a link which has, to a large extent, 
persisted to the present day. I believe this accounts for the popularity 
of superhero narratives.
Stigmatisation has been a feature of criminal codes throughout 
Western history. As Nigel Walker summarises:
Some measures – ‘peines infamantes’ – were deliberately designed to 
advertise the fact that a person had been found guilty of a crime. An 
example is branding and other visible mutilations, although in England 
the practice was eventually reduced to a not very visible burn-mark 
on the thumb which enabled courts to distinguish ‘first offenders’ 
from already convicted felons. The pillory, too, was essentially 
stigmatising, although it also exposed the offender to other dangers 
(Walker 1980:144).
State-sanctioned punitive mutilation stigmatised the criminal by 
advertising his wrongdoing. In other words, it made his criminal nature 
physically manifest, in effect rendering him into something identifiably 
non-human. This urge to stigmatise can be explained by European 
conceptions of honour and legitimacy.
Up to the early modern period, European nobility had defined 
themselves as ‘members of a warrior elite’ (Smuts 1999: 8). During the 
16th century, however, the increased use of mercenaries and infantry 
meant that fewer and fewer noblemen participated in warfare. Despite 
this, violence ‘remained an essential part of a nobleman’s life at this 
period’, and the existence of a culture of honour more or less guaranteed 
that violence was endemic at all levels of society (Asch 2003: 70-71). 
Thus, the transition from a culture of honour to a culture of law was 
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not a sudden societal shift, but an extended process of compromise, 
exchange and equivocation, whereby much of the old chivalric values 
were able to survive into the modern world (Smuts 1999: 12).
By the late 16th century, feuds (and related crimes, such as 
assassination) were on the decline, but other kinds of interpersonal 
violence, such as duelling, increased. The increased popularity of 
duelling was due to the increasing influence of ‘courtly ideals and 
values’ on the nobility, combining ‘polished manners’ with a hyper-
acute awareness of one’s place in the social hierarchy (Asch 2003: 73). 
Vengeance was considered a virtue, the only appropriate response to 
a transgression.
This was the historical and psychological context for the medieval 
and early-modern conception of the nature of legal punishment, as 
described by Michel Foucault in Discipline and Punish: ‘Besides its 
immediate victim, the crime attacks the sovereign’, both personally (in 
the sense that crime defies his will) and physically (in the sense that 
because the law constitutes ‘the force of the prince’, crime constitutes 
an opposed force that does violence to his royal agency) (Foucault 
1991: 47). As befitted a rigid social hierarchy that thought of itself in 
martial terms, the right of the sovereign to punish a transgressor is an 
extension of his right to make war on his enemies, the punishment of 
crime corresponding to the avenging of an insult against his status (48). 
Thus, the ceremony of punishment is ‘an exercise in terror’: ‘to make 
everyone aware, through the body of the criminal, of the unrestrained 
presence of the sovereign’ (49). The obvious manner in which this is 
done is torture, which is bound by three principles: it must produce a 
certain, quantifiable amount of pain, it must mark the body ‘to brand 
the victim with infamy’, and it must be ‘spectacular’, witnessed by all as 
the ‘triumph’ of the law (33-4). Here, the vengeance of the sovereign, 
while methodical, is the foundation of the law and the mark of political 
legitimacy.
As Foucault points out, petitions for changes to the manner in 
which justice was served arose in force during the eighteenth century, 
particularly in the context of protests against public executions (73). This 
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re-thinking of the principles of criminal justice was coincident with a 
widespread re-examination and analysis of the principles of government 
itself. Notable among these was Montesquieu, who enumerated three 
kinds of government, distinguished from one another by their basic 
philosophical principles. For republics, the defining principle is virtue 
(Montesquieu 1977: 117-8), in a monarchy, the principle is honour (121), 
and the final category, despotism, has no real need of laws (144), because 
its guiding principle is fear (123). It is as illegitimate for despotic rule 
to be guided by virtue or honour as it is for a republic or a monarchy 
to govern through fear, and the practice of punitive mutilation – since 
its operating principle is intimidation – is thus clearly not a function 
of justice or honour.
Fifty years after Montesquieu, Jeremy Bentham outlined ‘the 
principle of utility’. Bentham argued that the fundamental truths 
of human existence are pleasure and pain, and therefore actions, 
legislatures and people are moral that seek ‘the greatest good’ or 
“the greatest happiness’ (Bentham 1961: 1-4). Bentham lists several 
parameters for the proportionality of punishment, foremost among 
which that it should be severe enough to exceed any profit that 
the criminal might have gained by his actions (and in Bentham’s 
formulation, ‘profit’ also encompasses nonmaterial benefits, such 
as emotional gratification) (1961: 179-81). Bentham also advocated 
that punishments should have a preventative as well as a retributive 
function: therefore, the harshness of punishments should increase with 
the severity of the offence, the gradations of severity should be fixed 
and well-known, and in every case, every additional charge should be 
prosecuted – this would provide incentives to potential criminals to 
refrain from committing a crime, to commit only a minor offence if 
given the choice, or at least to do no more harm than necessary for his 
ends (1961: 181).
Bentham also categorises the principle of ‘sympathy and antipathy’, 
which can be summarised in the phrase ‘punish as you hate’ (1961: 17), 
among those that are antithetical to utilitarianism, but the fact remains 
that to repay a criminal act with anything less than the full equivalent 
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of suffering that act engendered is to be considered ‘Cruelty to the 
public, that is cruelty to the innocent’ (1961: 181). Vengeance is no 
longer a virtue, but Bentham recognises it as an operational paradigm 
of the human conception of justice – thus, reciprocal punishments are a 
necessary evil, and they have a positive, ‘instructive’ value proportional 
to their unpleasantness. Bentham’s utilitarianism does have some 
problems: most infamously, it appears to excuse almost anything so 
long as it brings about a ‘greater good.’ In other respects it changes 
nothing – the ‘instructive’ or ‘preventative’ qualities of utilitarian 
justice are essentially the same as governance by fear, as denounced 
by Montesquieu.
The main problem, as John Stuart Mill saw it, was that arguments 
about proportionality, individual rights and impartiality were most 
often articulated in favour of expediency, rather than justice (Mill 1972: 
40-41). This conflation of the concepts of fairness and pragmatism is 
perhaps not surprising, since we ‘are always predisposed to believe that 
any subjective feeling, not otherwise accounted for, is a revelation of 
some objective reality.’ Therefore, because we have an almost instinctual 
awareness of justice, we presume that justice must be objectively real 
(Mill 1972: 38-9). Mill argues the contrary, affirming that our ideals 
of justice are in fact social constructions. Justice has two ‘essential 
ingredients’: a desire to punish a person who has done harm, and 
the knowledge or belief that there is some definite individual or 
individuals to whom harm has been done. The former desire arises 
from two sentiments: ‘the impulse of self-defence, and the feeling of 
sympathy.’ Mill argues that humans differ from other animals in that 
our intelligence gives our sentiments an enlarged scope. Combined with 
sympathy, it gives rise to the psychological concepts of tribe, nation or 
species. This in turn gives rise to the urge to punish wrongdoing, which 
is in fact a desire for vengeance upon one who has hurt us, ‘through, or 
in common with, society at large’. Thus, the idea of justice presupposes 
two things – a rule of conduct, and a sentiment which sanctions that 
rule (1972: 47-49). That sanctioning sentiment is anger, as it was in the 
Middle Ages – again, little has changed.
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Moving into an analysis of the twentieth century, John Rawls 
argues that compliance with the law is not merely the product of the 
threat of punishment. As rational beings, people who are allowed their 
liberty come to understand legal codes ‘as an order of public rules... 
in order to regulate their cooperation’, and therefore, ‘the principle 
of liberty leads to the principle of responsibility’, without the threat 
of punitive sanctions (Rawls 1973: 241). Thus, violence cannot be a 
determinant of political legitimacy because ‘to each according to his 
threat advantage is not a principle of justice’ (1973: 141). The concept 
of justice has now been extricated from its earlier existence as the 
prerogative of wrathful tyrants, and has become a legitimising social 
principle, as Montesquieu described. Thus, we can assure ourselves 
that disproportionate punishments, and the irrational impulses behind 
them, have been consigned to a barbaric past.
William Ian Miller argues that the notion that ‘revenge systems 
gave way to compensation systems, which then paved the way for state-
delivered justice, amidst general rejoicing at the progress’ is incorrect 
– revenge co-existed with compensation, because it was a kind of 
compensation, using blood instead of money. Indeed, it was possible 
to trade one for the other, and buy off an aggrieved party’s right to 
claim blood, but those who accepted such a bargain were considered 
to have lost face (Miller 2006: 25-6). The law of the talion, ‘an eye for 
an eye, a tooth for a tooth’, implies both an upper and a lower limit for 
revenge – no more than one life for a life, but no less than one life for 
a life, either (2006: 21). However, the argument that revenge cultures 
stress moderation in asserting equality of value between one life and 
another, and that revenge is carried out with deference to dispassionate, 
almost mathematical codes, is as problematic as the utopian vision of 
progress from the vendetta to the modern legal sanction.
The excessive nature of legally sanctioned violence is evident in 
the historical record. Robert Adams notes that in England from the 
mediaeval to the Elizabethan eras, a person’s hands could be removed 
as punishment for theft or ‘seditious libel’, legs could be amputated for 
trespassing, and ears could be removed for non-attendance at church 
317
The Aesthetics of Supervillainy
(Adams 1998: 18). Some examples from Adams’ select list of execution 
methods – from around the world, and from antiquity to the twentieth 
century – are so horrific that it is difficult to imagine how they could be 
proportionate to any crime. They include boiling alive, scaphism – that 
is, covering the condemned in a substance that will attract insects, and 
leaving them to be eaten alive – crucifixion, drawing and quartering, 
garrotting, the gibbet, impaling, the mazzatello  –  mallet blows to 
the skull followed by stabbing – and stoning, to name but a few (1998: 
160). By the year 1800, Adams notes there were more than 220 offences 
punishable by death in Britain alone (1998: 42).
Vengeance is still implicit in our conception of punishment as a form 
of recompense for a crime, but despite Miller’s compelling arguments to 
the contrary, vengeance always tends to the excessive, especially when 
it is the prerogative of sovereign power. In Foucault’s words, ‘In the 
darkest region of the political field the condemned man represents the 
symmetrical, inverted figure of the king’ (Foucault 1991: 29), if only 
because everyone understands that it was the king that condemned 
him. There is a kind of logic to excessive punishment on the part of a 
sovereign, most clearly articulated by Niccolò Machiavelli – ‘it is much 
safer to be feared than loved’ (Machiavelli 2003: 94).
This in itself is not sufficient to explain the cultural tendencies that 
have contributed to the enduring popularity of superheroes. Alongside 
it, we must consider Giorgio Agamben’s reading of the ancient Roman 
figure of the Homo Sacer. This was a class of citizen (literally, ‘sacred 
man’) who could not be sacrificed to the gods, and yet had no legal 
protection for his existence – any Roman citizen could kill him without 
technically committing murder or being punished for it, as he existed 
‘outside both human and divine law’ (Agamben 1998: 47-8). Agamben 
goes on to argue that every society, ‘even the most modern – decides 
who its “sacred men” will be’ (1998: 81). Attendant with the existence 
of Homo Sacer is the fear of becoming one.
Slavoj Žižek argues that ‘What increasingly emerges as the central 
human right in late-capitalist society is the right not to be harassed ’, 
and this assumed right is accompanied by ‘an attitude of narcissistic 
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subjectivity which experiences the self as vulnerable, constantly exposed 
to a multitude of potential “harassments”’ (Žižek 2009: 35-6). I would 
argue that this late-capitalist persecution complex includes a perceived 
threat of harassment from government via the justice system. This 
resonates with Gilles Deleuze’s conception of ‘societies of control’, 
which he argues have taken over from the ‘disciplinary societies’ 
described by Foucault. The difference between them is that the ‘ juridical 
form’ of disciplinary societies was that of ‘the apparent acquittal’, while 
that of societies of control is ‘the limitless postponement’, so there is 
no ‘end’ to anything – once the justice system takes an interest in you, 
you are never free of it (Deleuze 1992: 5).
In democratic societies were punitive mutilations are unacceptable, 
one might ask what exactly a citizen has to fear. Walker lists seven 
different kinds of ‘labelling’ effects arising out of a criminal conviction, 
among which are included suspicion, ostracism and increased difficulty 
in seeking employment, but also three particular behavioural reactions: 
an ‘anti-label reaction’, in which the convicted person rejects the label 
as unfair, and behaves as a model citizen to prove it wrong; an ‘anti-
labeller reaction’, in which the subject may ‘reject the values of a society 
which seems to him unfair, or excessively censorious’; or, in some 
extreme cases, martyrdom, in which the conviction and sentence are 
seen as immoral, and ‘enlist support for him or for a cause.’ As well as 
all of these, there is the possibility that the convict will internalise the 
stigmatisation, ‘and may come to regard himself not merely as someone 
who has once stolen, or got drunk, behaved violently or destructively, 
but as someone who is “by nature” likely to do so’ (Walker 1980:142-3). 
In each case, the convict’s agency has been compromised by the power 
of a judge, in whom a residue of the political legitimacy of mediaeval 
monarchs still resides: the judge has the power and authority to brand 
you.
As I have argued before, ‘freakish’ heroes such as the X-Men do 
not fit into the category of Homo Sacer: their ‘deformities’ are rarely 
debilitating, and though their existence provokes the ire of various 
anti-mutant hate groups, they are also blessed with godlike powers 
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that place them beyond the direct reach of the law. The acquisition 
of superpowers could hardly be described as a ‘frightening’ prospect, 
in the same way that being labelled a murderer or sex offender would 
be. Thus, the fear of reprisal-from-above still exists, but rather than 
physical violence mandated by an omnipresent sovereign, this fear is 
of judgement itself. This dread is neatly encapsulated in Roland Barthes’ 
observation that ‘the Law is always prepared to lend you a spare brain 
in order to condemn you without remorse ... it depicts you as you should 
be, and not as you are’ (Barthes 1974: 44). A central element of this is 
the judicial homily, a ‘by-product of modern expectation that judges 
should give reasoned justifications for their sentences’ (Walker 1980: 
145), comprised of remarks made by a judge on the nature of the offence 
and the offender. These can be just as injurious to the defendant as 
punitive mutilation, especially if they are reproduced in the mass media.
Regardless of the absence of actual violence, however, in Western 
popular culture there is still an expectation that evil people should ‘look 
evil’, which in many cases still equates to mutilation – we want our 
villains to look as though they have been punished in such a manner. 
This has given rise to a narrative motif whereby villains are often scarred 
in ways reminiscent of mediaeval criminals, and the art-form in which 
this is perhaps most evident today is the superhero comic.
3 Legitimacy and the Superhero
Richard Reynolds lists seven characteristics which he believes define the 
superhero. First, ‘The hero is marked out from society. He often reaches 
maturity without having a relationship with his parents.’ Second, ‘At 
least some of the superheroes will be like earthbound gods in their 
level of powers.’ Third, ‘The hero’s devotion to justice overrides even 
his devotion to the law.’ Fourth and fifth, the extraordinary nature of 
the hero will be contrasted with both his mundane surroundings and 
a mundane alter-ego. Sixth, heroes are most often loyal to the state, 
‘though not necessarily to the letter of its laws’, and finally, ‘The stories 
are mythical and use science and magic indiscriminately to create a 
sense of wonder’. Reynolds then notes that ‘Turning some of these 
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laws on their heads... would give us a good working definition of the 
superhero’s opponent, the supervillain’ (Reynolds 1994:17).
Reynolds’ list does indeed accurately describe the superhero type, 
but the extrapolation of these characteristics does not always have 
a palatable result. Though Reynolds derived the above list using 
the steadfast Superman as an archetype, the composite of these 
characteristics is a near-omnipotent extremist who can hide in plain 
sight, is immune to prosecution by virtue of his or her scientific/magical 
powers, and substitutes his or her own rigid morality for the laws of the 
land. Thus, superheroes do not just pose questions about justice, but 
about political legitimacy as well. We are all too aware that immoral 
governments may hold legal authority, and that laws might not always 
be just, but our interpretations of what makes a government ‘immoral’ or 
laws ‘unjust’ will vary according to individual judgement – a dangerous 
consideration when the individuals in question are in possession of 
godlike powers. Even without those powers, the characters can pose a 
threat; as DiPaolo rightly points out, Batman is ‘a feudal prince who 
happens to live in a democratic society’, and thus presents the same 
kind of danger to that society that a superpowered hero would – luckily 
for the citizens of Gotham City, ‘Batman has the script on his side’ 
(DiPaolo 2009: 204), and thus the righteousness of his actions can 
never be in doubt.
Geoff Klock highlights three aspects of superhero politics which 
are particularly problematic: firstly, superheroes ‘always rely on physical 
violence and intimidation to fight crime’; secondly, as described above, 
the superhero is often a vigilante, and thus is technically a criminal. 
‘In these two respects’, Klock says, ‘many masked crime fighters differ 
from the Ku Klux Klan only in that they are usually afforded socially 
acceptable status on a large scale’.3 Thirdly, ‘superheroes most often 
occupy a reactionary role, traditionally emerging only to meet a threat to 
the status quo. Large-scale social changes are a supervillain signature’ 
(Klock 2002: 39).
Interestingly, Superman was originally conceived of by his creators 
Jerry Siegel and Joe Shuster ‘as a villain who wanted to take over the 
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world’ (Sassienie 1994: 22), and this conception has loomed large over 
American superhero comics ever since. As Klock puts it:
The implied threat of large-scale fascistic control must necessarily 
underlie superhero stories because of a fundamental power differential 
... The power differences among men are never so great that a few might 
not band together to stop one. In the world of superhero comics, this 
is simply not the case (Klock 2002: 41).
As comics notionally became more ‘mature’, this implied threat 
was increasingly acknowledged. In the prologue to The Man of Steel, 
John Byrne and Dick Giordano’s 1986 rewriting of Superman’s origin 
story, young Kal-El’s parents mitigate their feelings of revulsion at 
the inhabitants of planet Earth with the hope that their son will come 
to rule over the ‘savages’ and ‘shape them to proper Kryptonian ways’ 
(Byrne and Giordano 1994: 10-11). Similarly, Alan Moore’s renowned 
Watchmen not only presents superheroes for what they are – disturbed, 
self-righteous vigilantes – but culminates in the destruction of New 
York City as a utilitarian measure to bring about world peace. Image 
Comics’ ‘Wildstorm Universe’ is populated by numerous teams of 
godlike beings who impose their will on the world, most notably 
The Authority and The Monarchy. Superheroes are no longer treated 
as politically or ideologically innocent. As such, readers, creators 
and critics have grown accustomed to asking questions about the 
implications of the violence of these characters’ actions.
In administering this kind of lawgiving violence, superheroes 
effectively assume the position of mediaeval royalty. They constitute a 
‘warrior elite’: their actions are guided by honour, and the epic brawls 
between superpowered individuals are essentially duels writ large. 
Their ability to ‘make war’ constitutes both a right and an obligation 
to do so, and this in turn gives them the right to punish transgressors. 
Thankfully, as noted above, the context of the comic book means 
that this right to punish is always accompanied by an unerring moral 
judgement.
It is thus only logical that some comic book villains would be 
afflicted with punitive mutilations, their scarred bodies indicating 
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the omnipresence of the hero-as-monarch. In Western culture, the 
dichotomy between the sovereign and the condemned man means 
that the existence of a mutilated character is, in itself, evidence of the 
existence of a sovereign (or at least an indication that there is room 
for one). Within comics, however, these criminals are often deformed 
before they become criminals, in ways that provide advance warning 
about the precise kind of villain they are. In these cases, it does not 
matter whether or not the deformity preceded the criminality; this 
pre-emptive, almost karmic punishment makes the precise nature of 
their criminality physically manifest.
Batman villains are notable for this tendency. Two-Face has a 
bilaterally divided face – one side scarred and disfigured, the other 
untouched – which reflects his obsession with bilateral games of 
chance, such as the coin he flips to make decisions. Waylon Jones, 
otherwise known as ‘Killer Croc’, was born with an extreme form of 
genetic atavism that gave him a reptilian appearance, and grew up to 
be an animalistic sociopath. The Joker, also known as the ‘clown prince 
of crime’, has what appears to be an extreme case of risus sardonicus, 
which has been re-interpreted in the 1989 and 2008 Batman films as 
either chemical scarring or deliberate mutilation.  Mister Freeze, a 
mutant who must constantly wear a cryogenic suit or expire, is perhaps 
the most tragic figure of all the Batman villains, being a scientist who 
devoted himself to cryogenic research in a doomed attempt to save his 
beloved, terminally-ill wife. In the end, though, these characters’ pasts 
do not matter, only their actions. The motif of punitive or stigmatising 
mutilation has outlasted the actual practice, and whatever sympathy 
their tragic histories may garner, the fact remains that their appearances 
reflect their criminal personalities. The implied logic of the motif is that 
these characters are innately deserving of this kind of punishment. This 
is not to say that superheroes have the right to mutilate transgressors 
(very few would even countenance such action), but the deformity of 
the villain emphasises the hero’s right to punish them.
The motif of punitive mutilation is so well-recognised that some 
creators foreground it for comic effect. A notable example of this is 
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Garth Ennis’s Preacher, in which the villainous arch-conspirator Starr 
acquires a new disfigurement in every volume in which he appears: 
beginning with a missing eye (the result of a childhood maiming at 
the hands of a bully), Starr loses an ear in Volume 2, acquires a long 
scar over his scalp in Volume 3, then loses his right leg to a family of 
cannibals in Volume 6, and has his genitalia bitten off by a Rottweiler 
in Volume 8. When accused of being a ‘monster’ in Volume 9, he replies, 
‘You can’t say I don’t look the part’ (Ennis 2001: 161).
The superhero and supervillain, exaggerated forms of the sovereign 
and the ‘condemned man’ respectively, represent a world in which our 
instincts towards revenge can be satisfied logically as well as emotionally. 
However, the view of punishment as retribution or recompense for a 
crime has two flaws. Firstly, as previously argued, vengeance always 
tends to the excessive, especially when it is legitimised as justice. The 
second flaw is that there are some transgressions for which there can 
be no truly equal recompense. To take one example, Fritz Haarmann, 
the ‘Butcher of Hanover’, killed twenty-seven men and boys, and sold 
their flesh on the back market; he was executed by guillotine in 1925. 
The punishment was not equal to the crime in Haarmann’s case because 
he could only be executed once, and the swiftness of his death was not 
commensurate with the cruelty of his actions. Notions of recompense, 
be they utilitarian or straightforwardly retributive, break down in 
the case of mass murderers who ‘deserve’ more than is in our power 
to give them. This is not true within the confines of the comic book. 
DiPaolo maintains that ‘It is in Batman’s nobility – his desire to protect 
and improve his home city – that he has renewed appeal for modern 
audiences’ (DiPaolo 2009: 215). This is also true of superheroes more 
generally: the enduring popularity of superheroes arises partly from 
their similarity to feudal sovereigns, in that they can ‘wage war’ in 
punishing a transgressor, and they routinely battle individuals whose 
crimes are heinous enough to warrant this kind of reaction.
As Scott McCloud explains, the space between the panels of a 
comic, known as ‘the gutter’, is a key element in the comic-book reading 
experience: ‘Here in the limbo of the gutter, human imagination takes 
324
Fennell
two separate images and transforms them into a single idea’ (McCloud 
1993: 66). Juxtaposing two images – one of a man about to be murdered 
with an axe, the other a silhouetted city skyline accompanied with a 
‘screaming’ sound effect – McCloud goes on to explain the gutter’s role 
in the reader’s response to the text:
I may have drawn an axe being raised... but I’m not the one who let 
it drop or decided how hard the blow, or who screamed, or why... 
[Every reader] participated in the murder. You all held the axe and 
chose your spot. To kill a man between panels is to condemn him to 
a thousand deaths (68-9).
This example demonstrates that the gutter adds an interactive 
element to what on the surface appears to be a passive reading activity. 
As the reader’s mind makes the transition from image to image across 
the gutters and synthesises them into a coherent narrative, he or she 
vicariously takes part in the administration of justice upon an evildoer. 
This participation has three effects: first, it ‘ennobles’ the reader, thus 
removing the fear of judgement and punishment by placing him or her 
above the law; secondly, it distances the reader from the category of 
Homo Sacer by allowing him or her to partake in violence against such 
a person; thirdly, it gives the reader catharsis by presenting a world in 
which there is no contradiction between ‘excessive’ and ‘proportionate’ 
punishments. Not only can a supervillain endure any kind of horrific 
real-world torture, but the superhero genre’s blurring of science and 
magic allows for punishments that contravene the known laws of nature.
Conclusion
The appeal behind superhero narratives may be linked to their 
similarities to feudal lords, but it does not necessarily indicate a wish 
for feudal or fascist rule. Rather, superheroes serve as avatars who enact 
the reader’s righteous anger. Justice is no longer founded upon the 
vengeance of a sovereign, but the rage and fear of the de-individuated 
masses. Because their moral judgement is unerring and they have the 
means to wage war on those who have transgressed against society, 
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superheroes administer a form of justice that speaks to the concept’s 
fundamental vengefulness; they are, to paraphrase Bentham, at 
liberty to ‘punish as they hate’, much as feudal lords were. Part of 
our enjoyment of these stories comes from the fact that they make us 
feel simultaneously powerful and normal, they reaffirm our sense of 
ourselves as moral beings and they temporarily take away any fears we 
might have of being judged or punished. This function requires the 
superhero to have at least one mutilated, deformed or mutated nemesis. 
It is my opinion that this appeal is intrinsic to the superhero genre, and 
cannot be affected one way or the other by censorship or self-regulation. 
The CCA Code primarily impacted villains, rather than heroes (the 
exception to this is of course Batman, who became just as silly as his 
opponents during the 1960s).
The code did not exist in a societal vacuum. The very fact that it 
came about as an industry-wide response to moral criticism indicates 
that it was pandering to a number of pre-existing moral truisms. The 
restrictions on the depiction of criminals were ultimately less about 
the welfare of impressionable youth than they were about reinforcing 
community standards. Criminals came to be depicted as ‘decent people’ 
had always imagined them – ugly, dangerous and evil by nature. 
The villains depicted according to CCA guidelines are much more 
frightening than any real-world criminals, because they have no logical 
motive for their crimes.
For this reason, the much-reviled CCA Code, for all its faults and 
ridiculous moralising, did achieve one very important thing in that it 
created a whole new class of Homines Sacri by exaggerating that which 
already existed, and creating hate-figures without any real-world 
equivalent. The flamboyant, powerful, homicidal supervillain of today is 
not in the same category as the teenage delinquent, the panhandler, or 
the desperate drug-addict. Iron Man does not don his armour to hunt 
down pickpockets, Wonder Woman does not beat up litterbugs, and 
Batman does not pepper-spray protesting students. Though superheroes 
are most often patriotic, and most often arise to defend the status quo, 
they do not bring their rigid morality to bear on dissenters and the 
326
Fennell
marginalised, for the same reason that they no longer rescue cats from 
trees on a regular basis: superheroes are ‘big-picture’ people because 
they have supervillains to contend with.
The feudal appeal of the superhero, sometimes blurring into 
fascism, works by involving the reader in the cathartic punishment of 
an unambiguously evil or non-human villain, a punishment which is 
always proportionate and moral, despite having no upper limit. Without 
the supervillain, one shudders to imagine which Homines Sacri would 
find themselves on the receiving end of the hero’s, and the reader’s, 
law-giving violence.
Notes
1 I owe a debt of gratitude to My Learned Cousin, Shane Sibbel, for giving 
me the benefit of his legal knowledge and directing me towards the relevant 
bodies of theory.
2 The CCA did, however, include some valid restrictions on what could 
be represented in comic books. General Standards Part C of the code 
expressly forbade the ridicule of ‘any religious or racial group’, the section 
on Costume mandated that women be depicted ‘without exaggeration of 
any physical qualities’, and the Code for Advertising Manner ruled out 
advertisements for alcohol and tobacco products.
3 Klock notes that this is more accurate for the DC comics universe than 
Marvel.
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